A movement that can win

Here's the final part of my in-depth Counterfire article on the People's Assembly.

Let's outline - more positively - the potential of the People's Assembly, and the way socialists can utilise it to take the whole anti-cuts movement to a higher level. A few key points should be stressed.

1) The single greatest task for the movement at present is to overcome fragmentation, localism and sectionalism by providing co-ordination, including national-level forms of protest. We need to strike at the heart of austerity policies, which is the government. We need a coalition with such broad forces and such social weight that it can offer people a sense that we really can make a difference. Leaving protests at the local level, allowing campaigns to be separated from each other and keeping the movement narrow or divided are all recipes for defeat.

2) The 22 June event has to be seen as a springboard not only for action, but for the long-term national and local coalitions needed to call and deliver protests in the future. This is a process, not merely an event, one that has to be sustained and taken to higher levels of action.

3) If we want more co-ordinated strike action then we need to strengthen the unions by linking them with the rest of the movement in large-scale action. The push for strike action is not simply a matter of what trade unionists do within their unions; it is a matter for the whole movement. A bolder, bigger and broader movement on the streets raises the likelihood of renewed national strike action, feeding into the unions and the confidence of their members.

4) A national co-ordinating body is an essential pre-condition for serious international co-ordination. Austerity is Europe-wide and so is the opposition. With the European Union figuring prominently in current domestic political debate - but in a way that is shaped by right-wing arguments, from both Tories and Ukip - it is more necessary than ever to develop a common, continent-wide front against the disaster of austerity, which in some countries is even more devastating than in Britain.

5) The People's Assembly - not just the event itself, but as a continuing coalition - is the best context in which the left can promote its arguments, slogans and demands. This is the central way to build a stronger left-wing pole in British politics and society and shift the terms of mainstream debate. Extra-parliamentary activity, not electoral politics, is where we are at our strongest. It is, if you will, our counterweight to Ukip. A mass movement is the framework for articulating an alternative set of ideas: taxing the rich and pursuing the tax evaders, investing in jobs, transport and the green economy, scrapping the wasteful spending on weapons and war, countering the myths about immigrants or 'scroungers' being the source of our problems, democratising the banks and challenging the rule of finance capital.

No other strategy or initiative can come close to delivering all this. That is why the People's Assembly is not merely a nice idea or a worthwhile event, but the main basis for co-ordinating resistance to cuts for some time to come. We have to make it work. The stakes are too high for us to fail.

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People's Assembly: we need unity to beat austerity

This was first published on Counterfire.

The People's Assembly is a historic opportunity to shape a united, national anti-cuts movement that can turn the tide against austerity. 22 June will bring together everyone from NHS campaigners to leading trade unionists, from anti-bedroom tax activists to left-wing Labour MPs

The potential of the People's Assembly

The People's Assembly is expected to use the breadth and depth of the movement represented on the day to  become a launch pad for co-ordinated mobilisations such as solidarity actions with NUT and PCS strikers, a national demonstration, a day of local protests and regional people's assemblies throughout the country. It can become a turning point in creating the kind of national coalition we sorely need, launching the sort of action that can win results and generating greater confidence to resist among millions of people opposed to cuts.

It is a hopeful sign that there are already rallies and public meetings taking place in many areas in the run-up to 22 June, as these can help develop a mass movement after the Westminster event. We need more of these local meetings.

Owen Jones summed it up for many when he referred to the anger over cuts not yet being matched by hope, writing that hope - and the confidence to take action that comes with it - is precisely what the People's Assembly can offer. His fellow columnist Mark Steel drew a hugely enthusiastic response when he wrote about the millions of people shouting abuse at politicians on television, feeling isolated in their rage and frustration, but pointing to the Assembly as the way to pull those people together into a movement. Over three years into this Tory-led government, it reflects the weaknesses of the left and the trade unions that we are only doing this now.

The Assembly is especially vital because of the nature of austerity, and of the resistance to it. Although austerity is a coherent project driven by central government, it manifests itself in a plethora of 'single issues' and specific cuts, many of them at local level. Unsurprisingly, therefore, a great deal of the opposition has been focused on particular cuts and policies. Such protests and campaigns are necessary and extremely welcome, but also limited. The fragmentation of the movement can only be overcome through a broad-based national event like the People's Assembly, supplemented by a commitment to sustain co-operation in the long term.

There are, however, differences of opinion over what the People's Assembly represents, and what it can offer. Criticisms come from those who simply reject the People's Assembly, but also - in more muted or ambivalent fashion - from those who give it only lukewarm support. The notion, which I am arguing for here - that it should be the central strategic priority for the left - is a highly contested one. This debate has its specific features - to do with the People's Assembly itself - but differences over these features are linked to deeper differences over political strategy, especially the question of what is often called the united front method. I will address this below.

A radical movement

Broadly speaking, there are three types of criticism of the People's Assembly (which are often closely linked). Firstly, the idea that it is in some sense too moderate. This takes various forms, but they all depend upon sloganeering and position-taking rather than serious, practical thinking about what is possible.

One version of this criticism is that it will only result in 'A to B marches', and what is needed is more 'militant' action. Another line is that what's really needed is a general strike and as the Assembly can't deliver that, it is of limited value. Yet another view is that any political radicalism will be fatally compromised by being too broad, either because of the participation of Labour MPs or due to the role of trade union leaders.

The first of these positions is predicated on the idea that small-scale militancy is preferable to large-scale mobilisations such as marches and strikes. Yet successful mass movements throughout history have been built on the basis of the latter type of protests. This doesn't mean they have been limited to large-scale marches and rallies, but that such forms of protests have enabled mass participation, created powerful coalitions, and lifted the confidence of large numbers of people. When more militant 'direct action' does take place it is bigger and more effective due to developing in the context of a genuinely mass movement. This is a key lesson of the anti-poll tax and anti-Iraq war movements. For the anti-cuts movement such large-scale national action is particularly essential precisely because central government is the source of austerity and needs to be challenged directly.

The 'general strike now!' line, meanwhile, is an example of starting from an ideal picture of resistance rather than from where we actually are. We desperately need a greater level of strike action than at present, and it will be more effective if nationwide and co-ordinated across unions. The People’s Assembly has, in any case, already – in the statement launching the initiative – endorsed the TUC’s resolution in looking into the possibility of further co-ordinated mass strike action.

But limiting ourselves to calls for a general strike fails to recognise the existing strengths of our movement, which are in street-based protesting and campaigning, more than in strike action. It also fails to consider how the People's Assembly - and, more importantly, co-ordinated actions emanating from it - might provide steps towards a 'mass strike' scenario becoming a reality. And, crucially, it doesn't acknowledge that while trade unionists have a particularly pivotal role to play in fighting austerity, they are not the sum total of the broad movement.

The idea that involvement from some, supposedly more moderate, elements of the movement is a barrier to radicalism can be easily dismissed. If we are serious about stopping cuts we need to unite the widest possible layers in common discussion and action. In particular we need to involve people who at least partially look to Labour for a response to the Tory-led government's cuts; most such people are, it's worth noting, highly critical of Ed Miliband's weak opposition to cuts. Many millions of working class people will, however, vote Labour at the next general election. If they do not form a major part of the anti-cuts movement, the left is doomed to be a small minority when we could be a majority.

Many Labour MPs, councillors and party members are part of the opposition to austerity and should be involved in a broad movement that also includes many activists who reject Labourism altogether. Anything else is divisive posturing. Similarly, it is possible to be critical of particular failures by trade union leaders - and frustrated with the continuing low level of strike action - without dismissing the vital role such leaders have to play as part of a co-ordinated mass movement. The Assembly's commitment to broad unity in action is in fact the most authentically radical strategy available to us.

The top priority

The second sort of critical view is to argue that the People's Assembly has a place, but what's really needed is something else. This might be a general strike - as discussed above - or a growth in grassroots activism, or a more 'political' approach, whether 'reclaiming Labour' or focusing on building an alternative electoral vehicle to the left of Labour. These views often come from those who are supportive of the Assembly, but who see it as a lesser priority to some other project.

The problem with the 'grassroots activism' argument is simple: a successful national event like the Assembly is a boost to grassroots activism, not an alternative or challenge to it. National and local campaigning reinforce each other, providing that activists consciously make the links. The Assembly will be boosted by the participation of many grassroots campaigners from every part of the country; it, in turn, can strengthen the networks between them and provide a mechanism for developing greater unity and coherence in the movement at local level.

Local activity is essential but not enough: this hospital is saved, but the one 30 miles away still closes. National co-ordination is indispensable if we are to confront austerity as a whole. If we want to stop all cuts, everywhere, nationally organised action aimed at the government is required.

The emphasis on electoral work takes two very different forms. The first is to invest hopes in Labour. The problems here are that Labour's leadership is deeply committed to some version of austerity, the general election is in any case still two years away, and it is extra-parliamentary activity (more than electoral campaigning) that is likely to shift the terms of political debate in the next couple of years.

The second route is to create an alternative outside the Labour Party. Such an approach is desirable in principle, but it would certainly be a mistake to prioritise such initiatives over the building a broad, mass movement that encompasses everyone opposed to cuts. Not least is the question of timing: developing a credible electoral party is a long-term process, but cuts are biting now and there's an urgent need for an active response.

Current attempts at 'left unity' are unfortunately back-to-front in trying to create an electoral front principally out of fragments of the existing (and very small) radical left, instead of first creating a mass movement encompassing new political forces (as happened with the emergence of Respect from the mass Stop the War movement).

Unity in action

The third and final sort of criticism brings us explicitly to the issue of the united front. Some critics have rejected the united front, or coalition-building, method embodied in the People's Assembly, typically on the grounds that it is allegedly 'top-down' and 'bureaucratic'. Such criticism involves a dose of references to 'top table speakers' (an awful thing to be avoided at all costs) and an equal dose of objections that what's really needed it something driven 'from below'. Some of these critics refer to this as 'frontism'.

The essence of the People's Assembly is the notion that broad working class unity is of fundamental importance if we are to defeat the government. We have the numbers on our side, but we need organisation to turn that into a social force to be reckoned with. There will always be differences of opinion - and it is necessary to air and debate those differences - but they should not be a barrier to united action. Above all, we need to combine the size and organisational capacities of the trade unions with the numerous disparate campaigns involving single-issue activists, disabled people, students, pensioners and more.

Doing this effectively requires the support and active participation of national organisations, especially but not exclusively the unions, to create an inclusive framework which can involve the diverse range of people in our movement. If this is what some activists mean when they refer to doing things 'from above' then so be it: organisation 'from above' i.e. involving national organisations, is exactly what we need as a means for involving the maximum social forces and delivering the largest-scale action imaginable. There is no juxtaposition between 'above' and 'below', between the support of national leaders and organisations and, on the other hand, grassroots participation.

The united front 'from above' is precisely what facilitates the united front 'from below'. The former is important primarily as a means to the latter, since it is the class struggle itself - not the rhetoric of leaders - that ultimately shapes history. Millions of people look to reformist leaders - whether Labour politicians, trade union general secretaries or prominent individuals - so to draw people into activity we seek alliances at the top with those leaders.

Furthermore, it is possible for grassroots forces to pull more moderate or reluctant leaders to the left. For this to happen, though, there first has to be a meaningful coalition. It should also be recalled that the trade union movement organised the two mass demonstrations against the cuts - on 26 March 2011 and 20 October 2012 - when hundreds of thousands were mobilised, illustrating the power of protests backed by union leaders. It's that experience of struggle that both brings confidence and reveals the limits of the union leadership.

Some critics tend to complain that the Assembly will be a series of 'top table' speeches, when what's really needed is workshops or smaller-scale gatherings that allow the voices of grassroots activists to be heard. Again, this is a false juxtaposition. It is in the nature of a very large event that it will involve a lot of speeches - and it is quite right that many (not all) of these speeches will be from elected national representatives, as they can speak on behalf of their members and give a powerful sense of the breadth and depth of the movement. PCS general secretary Mark Serwotka, for example, will be calling for support for striking PCS members in the week after the People’s Assembly. It makes sense for him to be heard.

A successful national event will make it more, not less, likely that we can organise local and regional assemblies that also pull together a diverse coalition, but with more scope for the voices of local activists. The main national event will, through its large scale and broad composition, provide a powerful platform for generating these grassroots forms of co-ordination, which will be more effective precisely because they are part of a national framework. Similarly, the claim from some that the Assembly will be only a ‘talking shop’ misses the mark: the purpose of the event is to launch action at a higher level than we could achieve without it.


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Say What? A few thoughts on language and the Left

Here is my article in the new issue of Scottish Left Review. Some of it is adapted from previous material on Luna17.

There is one thing that most people forget about the Poll Tax: it wasn’t called the Poll Tax. It was called the Community Charge. But nobody remembers it as the Community Charge, do they? The left’s preferred name for it – Poll Tax – entered popular usage and helped create the widespread rejection of the policy. The Scottish left played a particular role in this – and more generally in initiating a mass movement – as it was introduced north of the border a year earlier than in England.

Similarly, if you do an online search for ‘bedroom tax’ you might discover that the government doesn’t call it any such thing. It is in fact the ‘under-occupancy penalty’. That’s the sort of term that you forget as soon as you have read it. ‘Bedroom tax’ is much catchier. Names and phrases like these have the capacity to mobilise people in opposition: nobody will ever join a protest against an ‘under-occupancy penalty’, but they will join protests against a bedroom tax.

The war in Iraq, too, was always a linguistic battlefield. Its supporters called it anything except a war: it was an ‘intervention’, quite possibly a ‘humanitarian intervention’. As the Stop the War Coalition’s name indicates, our side did the opposite: we rammed home the fact that it was a war, we labelled it (correctly) as ‘illegal’, and we linked words like ‘war’, ‘bombing’ and ‘invasion’ to powerful visual imagery (see, for example, David Gentleman’s powerful use of splattered blood in Stop the War posters at the time).

Language is a vital part of how political controversies are perceived and discussed by large numbers of people. It therefore makes a difference when the left successfully finds an accessible way of talking about issues, framing them in a way that increases our influence in the wider debate.

In many ways we are swimming against the stream, due to the pernicious influence of right-wing media representations and the language deployed by mainstream politicians. Notice how words like ‘welfare’, ‘benefits’ and ‘immigration’ have become so ideologically loaded – they are almost assumed to be negative, rather than merely neutral (or, for that matter, positive). But that doesn’t mean we are resigned to irrelevance – we can challenge and subvert this ‘common sense’ language, and give expression to a kind of ‘good sense’ that is widespread among millions of people.

This is not to subscribe to a kind of linguistic determinism and suggest that language is responsible for the outcome of political struggles. It is merely one factor, but it is one that can often be neglected on the contemporary left. Also, it does not mean – or shouldn’t mean – a patronising ‘dumbing down’ whereby we assume that a broad working class audience can’t possibly understand words of more than one syllable.

I would love to see three overlapping types of language consigned to history: cliches; pointlessly obscure terms and pseudo-academic expression; and retro phrase-mongering.

When I refer to cliches I’m thinking of a sort of left-wing auto-speak, i.e. things we say or write without really being conscious about whether they mean anything to our intended audience. We won’t be able to agree on which phrases do and don’t come under this category, but ‘fightback’ (as a noun) would definitely be on my list. So would ‘the class’, as in the line ‘It’s important we conduct political debates openly in front of the class’. The sentiment is fine, but if you really do want to conduct debates openly within a wider working class milieu then it would be a good start to think about how you express yourself.

Let’s also drop phrases like ‘ConDem’ which simply haven’t been picked up by anyone beyond the left. More controversially, I’d like to see the phrase ‘left unity’ ditched. Why does hardly anyone on the left realise that it is alienating to anyone who is not already part of the left? The implication, after all, is a cobbling together of the exisiting fragments of the left. Not a terribly attractive proposition, is it?

What about the problem of obscure and academic expression? I’m thinking here of writers and public speakers deploying language that is specific to the world of the academic social sciences. Most people who do this aren’t even aware they are doing it – they have become so influenced by that academic world they forget that many people are alienated by its language.

The radical left has never been more rooted in academia than it is today: most socialists who write for left-wing publications, have blogs or websites or get books published, are influenced by it. They are university lecturers, postgraduate (or sometimes undergraduate) students, or have previously been part of the academic milieu. The language they use is often, unsurprisingly, influenced by their social conditions.

Retro fetishism – the use of phrases that nobody in 2013 ever actually says – is especially problematic. A speaker at a recent anti-cuts rally in Newcastle – which was mostly characterised by superb, passionate and crystal-clear speeches – actually uttered the words “TUC general council, get off your knees” (a phrase that should not be heard outside the auditions for an Arthur Scargill biopic).

Another example: shop stewards. When almost nobody under the age of 35 has the faintest idea what a ‘shop steward’ is, why on earth would anyone on the left use the term? What’s wrong with ‘workplace reps’ or ‘grassroots activists’? Clinging to dead language is not the same thing as principled fidelity to a set of ideas for understanding the world. It is possible to remain faithful to a political tradition and communicate with people in a way they understand.

It is sometimes suggested that we should learn about political language from right-wingers. Here’s what Owen Jones once wrote:

‘Raid the language of the right. Why not? They started it, nicking words like ‘progressive’. The cheek. They use words like ‘modernising’ (privatising stuff) and ‘reforming’ (cutting services and sacking people), because it helps paint the left as dinosaurs and the ‘real’ conservatives. So how about we start talking about bringing the railways into the 21st century, for example?’

There is something to be said for this, but we need to be careful. The right stole the language of the left because they wanted to sound more ‘progressive’ than they actually were. It was the Blairites who mastered the art of linguistic re-definition: they wanted to win people’s consent to right-wing policies, but the people whose consent they wanted were not right-wing. Their linguistic contortions were part of the rightward shift of ‘New Labour’: pretty words to disguise the bullshit beneath.

Saying we should ‘bring the railways into the 21st century’ is valid if we then go on to outline what that means in policy terms, i.e. renationalisation. On its own it is empty and meaningless. It is an example of the vagueness characteristic of modern political language, which is hollow, managerial and devoid of ideas.

We on the left should prioritise the specific over the vague because we actually stand for something. We have no reason to conceal what we stand for – we want definite action, not inaction disguised as radicalism. We need to be concrete: language that lives and breathes, not dead or retro clichés and empty phrases.

Different styles are appropriate for different audiences. An accessible writing style is a greater priority when trying to reach a wide audience. But even in more theoretical or academic writing, perhaps targeted at a niche audience, it is surely better to write clearly and succinctly than to be convoluted and tedious.

Some jargon, however, is unavoidable. If someone writes about physics they must inevitably use some technical and scientific vocabulary, even if they are writing a popular science book or article for a lay, non-specialist audience. The same applies to politics. There are good reasons for having specialist vocabulary. A good example is the word ‘neoliberal’ – you can’t avoid using it. This is because there’s simply no other, better-known, word that describes the same thing. Of course, a good writer catering for readers unfamiliar with the concept will provide relevant examples or elaborate on what they mean with more familiar concepts.

Also, it’s good to expand our vocabulary. As children we learn and broaden our horizons precisely by picking up on new words and working out their meanings – not normally by looking them up in a dictionary, but by figuring them out from context or, quite simply, asking someone bigger than us the question ‘Why?’ The same is true for adults; and it applies to politics as it does to anything else. We therefore shouldn’t be afraid of sometimes using words our readers may not be familiar with.

It’s essential we avoid the trap of thinking ‘clear, direct and accessible’ has to mean basic, plain and unimaginative. When reading online it isn’t terribly difficult to look up an unfamiliar or obscure word. The problem comes when there’s so much arcane vocabulary that your reading is disrupted by frequently switching to Google search.

In general the weaknesses in left-wing language come from long years of relative isolation, which encourages defensive dogmatism and an insular focus on communicating with each other rather than reaching out. Hence the sterile vocabulary, pointlessly obscure references, and hopelessly dated expressions. But let’s not wait until an upturn in mass resistance before we give ourselves a language reality check. How we communicate is of paramount importance if we are to influence the direction of mass politics and shape a new left.


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Dangerous Ideas for Dangerous Times

Dangerous Ideas for Dangerous Times is a left-wing political festival in central London.

On 31 May and 1 June it will bring together people from the forefront of global struggles: radical economists and philosophers, socialists, feminists and environmentalists, students and trade unionists. It aims to fill the halls, parks and public spaces of King's Cross with a mix of politics, film, art, music and the spoken word.

Speakers include David Harvey, Laurie Penny, Tariq Ali, Owen Jones, Nina Power, Tony Benn, Seumas Milne, Rafeef Ziada, Terry Eagleton, Lindsey German, Jeremy Corbyn, Sanum Ghafoor, Paul Le Blanc, Kate Hudson, Neil Faulkner and Danielle Obono.

Learn more about the Dangerous Ideas festival here. Register here.

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Is this the way forward for the Left?

Left Unity is an initially impressive attempt to develop a new left-wing network that can contest elections. Ken Loach's call for such a network generated widespread enthusiasm, with thousands signing in support online and the emergence of local groups. 

Alan Thornett, from the Socialist Resistance group, recently wrote one of the few serious attempts so far to outline a rationale for the new Left Unity initiative. It can be read here. A word of caution is needed: there will no doubt be others involved in Left Unity who have a different view to Thornett on particular aspects.

I want to look at the ideas and assumptions which underpin Thornett's case for the Left Unity project. Let's work through them in turn.

1. It is feasible to have a UKIP of the left.

Thornett writes of the recent local elections: 'The left was nowhere in the election – there was nothing to rally the left in the way UKIP rallied the right – which raised again the desperate need for a broad party of the left which can start to do what Syriza has done in Greece: provide a clear anti-austerity platform to which the working class can relate.'

The rise of UKIP is a problem we ought to take seriously - and it reveals not only the depth of disillusionment with mainstream politics, but the capacity for parties outside it to make breakthroughs. It is undoubtedly correct, in general terms, to want a left-wing party with similar levels of success to operate as a counterweight and strengthen the left-wing pole in British society.

But there is only any point in framing the challenge the left faces in these terms - we need something to 'rally the left in the way UKIP rallied the right' - if we think it's possible to emulate UKIP's success. The assumption is that there exists a spectrum of opinion from far left to far right, that the mainstream parties occupy only a narrow strip of its centre ground, and there is consequently great scope for electoral success to both their left and to their right.

But is there? This overlooks the obvious point that a Tory-led government is more conducive than a Tory opposition to stimulating growth in a hard-right party like UKIP. This is because UKIP's current success is, to an extent, facilitated by disillusionment with the Tories in office. This is especially so because they are governing in coalition with the Lib Dems, seen by many right-wingers as something that pressures the Tories to the centre ground. When the Tories are in opposition they are more likely to soak up a lot of hard-right populist sentiment themselves.

Labour, meanwhile, is in opposition and therefore absorb much of the anti-austerity and anti-Tory sentiment on the left. Many people are deeply disenchanted with the Labour leadership and they are right to be so - but that doesn't necessarily translate into willingness to vote for left-wing parties (never mind join them).

Labour is a broad church that extends well to the left of Ed Miliband. Regardless of the chronic weaknesses of the party's leadership, Labour remains the principal electoral vehicle for those who are opposed to cuts, the main hope in electoral terms for millions of people who want an end to austerity. I would rather it was otherwise and I reject the notion of 'reclaiming Labour' or limiting our electoral horizons exclusively to Labour. In the longer term we sorely need an alternative to Labour. But we are where we are: left-wing strategy needs to take account of current conditions.

2. It is realistic to have a British Syriza.

See the above quote again, which includes this: 'the desperate need for a broad party of the left which can start to do what Syriza has done in Greece'.

Who wouldn't love a British Syriza? While the party isn't a perfect model - no party elsewhere can be such a thing - the enthusiasm for Syriza is generally justified. It has decisively demonstrated that a radical left-wing party can earn popular support and even challenge for governmental office, as well as offering some good lessons in how to connect electoral politics with anti-austerity movement building.

Yet there are 3 immediate problems here. Firstly, the crisis is more acute in Greece than in Britain, thus creating a greater political polarisation and a larger audience for radical solutions (the relationship between these things is not mechanical, but clearly there is a link). Secondly, the Greek equivalent of Labour, i.e. Pasok, has been complicit in implementing austerity, which naturally means that few Greeks look to it as the answer to austerity. This has opened up space for Syriza.

Thirdly, Syriza is the result of a long-term process over many years: its prominence and high levels of support have depended on hard work over a long time. Furthermore, it has succeeded in involving large chunks of the Greek left, which is a sizable constituency (when you consider Greece's population is at most a fifth of Britain's population, the Greek left is a much more credible organised force than the British left). It is fanciful to imagine that the same conditions apply to Britain as in Greece.

3. The wider European situation also bodes well for our prospects.

Thornett writes: 'Similar parties have been built in a number of European countries'.

Actually, nowhere else has come close to Syriza levels of popular support and electoral success. The story of new European left parties has been a complex mixture of breakthroughs, new alignments, conflicts, decline and splits. Even a party like Die Linke - which emerged from serious, substantial social forces - has struggled to achieve sustainable electoral breakthroughs in Germany. France's Left Front has had mixed results and, in any case, rests upon the participation of the French Communist Party, which is several times as big as all of Britain's left-wing organisations combined.

Let's be blunt: if Left Unity makes any serious progress in elections - and, crucially, doesn't then disintegrate or enter a serious crisis - it will be more the exception than the rule.

4. Previous problems in developing electoral coalitions on the British left have been because of a lack of 'internal democracy'.

Thornett writes: 'Prime opportunities to build such a party, over the past 15 years had been squandered by sectarianism. This had produced a series of damaging splits which had seriously undermined the credibility of such a project. The key factor in each case was internal democracy, or the absence or abuse of it. It had revolved around whether these organisations could have a decision making process independent of the principal far left organisation involved, or the principal important individual.'

This is surprisingly apolitical. Previous attempts - Socialist Labour Party, Socialist Alliance, Respect, Scottish Socialist Party - have not ultimately failed because of internal democracy or sectarianism. There have been political causes.

The implication here is that if only Left Unity gets its democratic structures right then previous difficulties can be avoided. It rests upon accepting a highly caricatured view of those earlier attempts and (unintentionally, to be sure) encourages an insular, apolitical approach to any new project.

5. Left Unity is better off without the 'big far-left organisations'.

Thornett writes: 'Not that creating a new broad party will be easy given the propensity of the left in England to squander such opportunities and the legacy which has been left by the previous failures – particularly the actions of the big far-left organisations... There seems to be a general consensus that a new organisation should be a broad, pluralist, left of Labour, anti-austerity party and one that is not dominated, undemocratically by a far-left organisation.'

The involvement of relatively large socialist groups can indeed potentially bring problems - certainly if there is an imbalance between them and the weight of other forces - but to overlook the positive side to their participation is unhelpful. This, obviously, is their ability to provide a sizable number of activists to help with campaigning and building local groups.

It is also odd because it undermines the notion of 'left unity', as if saying 'Let's unite the left, but not the SWP and the Socialist Party, i.e. the two biggest left-wing organisations'.  There is an element of sectarianism dressed up as anti-sectarianism in this. It is also surely a crucial reality check for anyone thinking that Left Unity really does mean, well, left unity.

It should also be noted, by the way, that Left Unity is not filling a vacuum in electoral politics. There is already TUSC, the SLP, Respect and - if you adopt a looser definition of what it means to be a left-wing party - the Green Party. There is no acknowledgement of such competition - and the problems posed by it - in the article.

6. It is an asset to NOT have charismatic leaders.

Thornett writes of Left Unity: 'Nor does it have a big charismatic leader. Ken Loach will no doubt continue to support, but such ‘big leader’ roles are anathema to him. There is no George Galloway or Tommy Sheridan (who split the SSP in Scotland) type figures for example. This can be a disadvantage when it comes to elections but it also has a positive side given the havoc which such figures have reeked in the recent past.'

Whatever your view of particular individuals - and their strengths and weaknesses - it simply isn't credible to deny the usefulness of effective leaders who can help win elections. Such a view is especially odd in the field of electoral politics, where personality (to put is in simple terms) matters more than it does in other spheres of left-wing activity.

Thornett's view also involves a mis-understanding of the complex forces which account for the demise of Respect and the SSP, instead opting for the simplistic and inaccurate 'blame Galloway'/'blame Sheridan' thesis.

7. Results can be delivered if consistent work is done between elections.

Thornett writes: 'Electoral strategy has not yet been discussed but it is clear that the approach of TUSC – which is to parachute into constituencies with no record on the ground and to do nothing between elections will be rejected.'

This is an appealing idea and has a grain of truth - it's true, indeed, that sustaining a local campaigning presence brings better results on election day than just campaigning for a few weeks. But only up to a point. There's a sort of naive idealism here: if we just make sure we keep organising the whole year round then we will get elected. It isn't necessarily so.

It also overlooks the simple fact that Left Unity will only stand any chance of getting candidates elected - or even getting the kind of credible 2nd or 3rd places that can lay the basis for future success - if there is a profound concentration of resources on a small number of seats. Such a strategy, unfortunately, pulls in a different direction to the building of sustainable local groups. With relatively small numbers of campaigners, you can't seriously do both. (I refer to a 'relatively small number of campaigners' because even if optimistic estimates - a couple of thousand active members - are realised it will be a fraction of what the big parties have got).

8. It is possible to develop a credible left-wing party without any cracks in the existing labour movement, i.e Labour Party and trade unions.

There is no reference to potential trade union support for Left Unity, or any reference to Labour (other than to its weaknesses), anywhere in the article.

The assumption that Left Unity can become a credible electoral vehicle without any Labour MPs breaking from their party, or sections of the trade union movement breaking with Labour, may turn out to be valid. But it probably won't be, if past experience in this country and international experience are anything to go by.

Thornett gives the impression that Left Unity is more an expression of new co-operation between a number of small elements of the radical left than a serious re-configuring in the broader labour movement. Indeed that's precisely what it is at present - and that is unlikely to change.

 9. A new left-wing party is a greater priority for the radical left than building a united anti-cuts movement.

This is not explicitly stated, but why is there no mention - in a long article about current priorities - of the People's Assembly specifically or the movement more generally (except a passing reference to anti-cuts organisations, designed to illustrate a point about divisions on the left, which is unrelated to the central arguments in the article)?

Why is Left Unity NOT being formulated in the context of the anti-cuts movement? Thornett seems to suggest that the two dominant priorities at present are building a new left-wing party and regroupment on the far left. Where does the building of a united movement to stop austerity fit in?  There's a risk that a narrow notion of 'left unity' comes to be privileged over broader class unity. Electoral politics could be prioritised over - and largely divorced from - extra-parliamentary struggles.

This is not to question the dedication of many Left Unity supporters to activity outside electoral politics, and specifically to the People's Assembly (which Left Unity supports). I am sure that many Left Unity supporters will enthusiastically build the People's Assembly and many will be active in the anti-cuts movement locally. That is very welcome. But the pressure of Left Unity is likely to be away from prioritising the development of anti-cuts co-ordination, especially if the significant omissions in Thornett's article are any kind of guide.

Conclusion

What should we conclude from all this? Without ruling out any kind of electoral work for the left at all, I don't regard it as a worthy priority in the current period. In fighting austerity our focus should be on building the People's Assembly, ensuring the event leads to on-going co-operation and unity at a higher level of activity than we already have, and using opportunities like the Assembly to articulate an alternative political message (an alternative to not only the Tories but Labour's leaders too).

This is what's really necessary for building a movement that can shake the government, for shaping anti-cuts struggles in a left-wing direction, and for strengthening the left within British society. This approach may, in turn, create more favourable circumstances for a new left-wing party - and one, indeed, with an organic relationship with the broad anti-cuts movement - but the pressing priority is to unite everyone who wants to stop cuts and provide powerful left-wing ideas at the core of such united activity.


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What is left of Leninism?

This is my third blog post engaging with contributions to Socialist Register 2013: A Question of Strategy. The previous two posts are here and here. I am just finishing off an extended review of the Socialist Register volume, which will appear on Counterfire soon.

 

In a lengthy essay called 'What is left of Leninism? New European left parties in historical perspective' - which can be found in Socialist Register 2013: A Question of Strategy - Charles Post provides a sweeping historical survey of the 20th century revolutionary left. This includes the development of a number of mass Communist Parties in the early 1920s and, during the Stalinist era, their political degeneration. But it's the analysis of the radical left since 1968 that I want to focus on here. The essay's author is a sociology professor at City University New York (CUNY), but also an activist in the US revolutionary group Solidarity, and he has interesting insights into developments on the radical left in Europe.

In the 1968-75 period there was substantial growth in Trotskyist and Maoist organisations, shaped by the upsurge of student and worker militancy of those years and offering an alternative to both social democracy and official Communism. There was a widespread view, among revolutionaries at this time, that conditions were comparable to the post-1917 period and the growth of genuinely mass revolutionary parties was a viable prospect, just as happened in much of Europe (and to an extent beyond) during the years following the Russian Revolution. 

 

These prospects were dashed, as a period of working class retreat began in the mid-1970s and the neo-liberal offensive commenced. The European revolutionary left was thoroughly disoriented and suffered a series of splits; some groups collapsed, others declined. The authentic non-Stalinist revolutionary left never, in the 1970s, grew to the scale seen in some countries during the Third International period of the early to mid 1920s.

 

Surviving the downturn

The downturn period saw a largely successful neo-liberal assault on the working class, with a weakening of trade union power, a shift in weight from the rank and file to the union bureaucracy, a decisive move rightwards in the Labour Party and its continental equivalents, and the marginalisation of the radical left and its ideas (intellectually Marxism came under sustained assault). Post observes that only two small but substantial revolutionary organisations survived the downturn period with membership largely intact and a credible base among militant workers: the British International Socialists (IS) and the French Revolutionary Communist League (LCR). Both of these were Trotskyist organisations; the Maoist left, meanwhile, had almost entirely collapsed by the end of the 1970s.

 

The IS, which became the Socialist Workers Party in 1977, adapted well to changing circumstances and took important initiatives like the Anti Nazi League in the late 1970s, a united front that was successful in beating back the threat of the far right, while also sustaining a base in the trade unions despite vastly more difficult circumstances that the upturn in struggle in the early 1970s. The SWP came through the 1980s and 1990s with a solid activist base intact, with roots in an admittedly weakened organised working class, so that in the early years of this century it could play an impressive role in anti-capitalist and anti-war movements, and for a time in new left-wing electoral formations.  The LCR, similarly, maintained a credible layer of working class activists throughout the 1970s and 1980s, so that it was able to intervene in fresh workers' struggles from the mid-1990s onwards and, a little later, the anti-capitalist movement.

Post argues that these organisations were about as successful as could reasonably be expected in harsh circumstances. The aspiration to develop new mass revolutionary parties that could challenge reformists (in parliament and the trade unions) for leadership of the working class movement was, however, unfulfilled. The revolutionary left remained a small minority current, marginal to the broad labour movement.

This wasn't simply, argues Post, because there was a period of defeats for the working class or a crude result of economic and social changes. It was largely due to circumstances beyond revolutionaries' control, but these were as much to do with the nature of the working class movement as anything, i.e. the political and organisational domination of the working class by reformism, manifested in the weight of the trade union bureaucracy, the strength of long-established social democratic parties (like the British Labour Party) and the role of Communist Parties which had long since accommodated to the system. The revolutionary left repeatedly found itself confronting these obstacles within the broader movement. And when a new wave of anti-capitalist mobilising developed at the start of this century, radical consciousness tended not to translate into specifically Marxist ideas and allegiance to the revolutionary left.

 

New parties of the European left

This brings us to the development of new parties of the European left over the last decade or so. The space for such parties was created primarily by the capitulation of social democracy to neo-liberalism and - to a lesser but still important degree - the collapse of the Communist parties after 1989 and the fact that revolutionary organisations were too small to fill the gap. The character of these parties was also influenced by the development of generally street-based protest movements. In the early 2000s, with the rapid growth of anti-capitalist and anti-war movements, Italy's Party of Communist Refoundation (PRC) held out great promise. But the PRC made enormous concessions to parties to its right, which effectively finished it as a credible left-wing force.

Since that time a number of new left-wing parties have emerged, some of which have since collapsed or fragmented while a few have been sustained fairly successfully. Germany's Die Linke, formed in 2007, is an interesting example because it resulted principally from a fusion of an old Communist left (based mainly in the East) with the left-wing of social democracy disenchanted with the neo-liberal trajectory of that political tradition (based mainly in the West). Die Linke has had some ups and downs since then and it is currently unclear how it will develop.

 

Some parties, like the earlier (2004-07) version of Respect in England and Wales and the Scottish Socialist Party, have been quite different in character: the revolutionary left has been the principal driving force, lending them considerable radicalism but without the benefits brought by large-scale cracks in the mainstream parties of social democracy or in the union movement. Reformism has remained a more powerful block than many revolutionary activists anticipated, despite a deepening loss of faith in mainstream politics among millions of people and the poor record of social democracy in office.

Newer parties of the left are sometimes held up as shining lights for us to follow, but Post argues that they have in fact suffered from a whole series of problems and, furthermore, they are incapable of successfully moving beyond the old divide in the socialist movement between reformism and revolutionary politics. Most of them have had an important degree of success, some continue to be successful, and they have generally been worthy of support and participation. But they have had difficulty grappling with such questions as how to connect parliamentary and electoral activity to extra-parliamentary activity, how to overcome the weaknesses of the trade unions, and how to prevent sliding to the right and into compromises with neo-liberal politics.

 

A third way between Labourism and Leninism?

Crucially, Post argues, it is simply impossible to successfully be both post-social democratic and post-Leninist. Ultimately, it is still necessary for the most advanced, revolutionary elements of the working class to organise independently in their own organisations, separate from reformist parties. This is one of the central lessons of 1917 and the period which followed the Russian Revolution.

 

The new parties of the left have not 'transcended the pre-1914 social democratic 'twin pillars' organisational norm where the party focused on electoral politics, while the union officialdom directed day-to-day class struggle in the workplace and beyond'. These new parties have reproduced the old challenges of social democracy, dating back to before 1914: 'the contradictions of entering capitalist governments, the relationship of electoral and routine trade union activity and mass, extra-parliamentary struggles, and the issues of war and peace'.

None of this remotely means that the new left parties are unimportant and should be disregarded. It does, however, strongly suggest that independent revolutionary organisation - and the united front method, whereby revolutionaries work with  those who have reformist consciousness in extra-parliamentary struggles over shared demands - is as necessary as ever. Post looks to 'the revival of the rational core of Leninism - the transcendence of the division of labour between party and unions and movements through the organisation of radical and revolutionary activists who attempt to contest the forces of official reformism over the conduct of mass struggle.'

 

Finally, Post points out that the political development of left-wing parties is shaped by two especially important factors: the outcome of extra-parliamentary struggles against austerity, and the relative strength within these parties of radical anti-capitalists, who can counter the pressures which are liable to pull such parties in a more moderate direction. Revolutionaries, if they can organise effectively, can influence the direction of credible left-wing parties where they exist. In all countries, whether there is such a party or not, revolutionaries have the challenge of shaping anti-austerity struggle beyond the realm of electoral politics and strengthening the radical anti-capitalist pole within those movements.

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UKIP and British politics today

 

This week's county council election results, together with the South Shields parliamentary by-election, appeared to represent a breakthrough for the United Kingdom Independence Party. Some caution about long-term predictions is required: UKIP hasn't yet shown it can win a parliamentary seat and the first-past-the-post system means there's no guarantee Nigel Farage's hard-right party will do so in the 2015 general election. There may, also, be a swing back to the Tories among right-wing voters in 2015, with no guarantee that a mid-term 'protest vote' can be sustained.

 

Nonetheless, UKIP's success on Thursday is substantial enough to justify taking the issue of the party's rise seriously. UKIP took nearly a quarter of all votes in the local elections. This is not representative of the country as a whole, as it was largely the 'shires' that went to the polls this week, but together with recent opinion polls it indicates clear growth in support for the party.

 

The South Shields result is also significant. Getting almost 25% in the Labour heartlands (the Tyneside seat has had a Labour MP continuously since 1935 and has never returned a Tory since the Great Reform Act of 1832) shows UKIP can prosper way beyond the semi-rural, predominantly middle class southern English seats regarded as its home turf. In South Shields UKIP functioned as a way for right-of-centre voters to register disenchantment with the coalition parties: Lib Dem and Tory support fell dramatically.

The relative success in South Shields does not, however, mean that UKIP is picking up lots of ex-Labour voters. Previous polling on this question indicates that a high proportion of UKIP voters have voted Tory in the past; traditional Labour voters are a small part of the UKIP voting base. This is even true in an area like South Shields: note that Labour's percentage of the vote held up (just over 50%). The number of votes for Labour declined, but that has a lot to do with the lower turnout which is typical of a by-election.

 

It is, however, obvious that Labour cannot assume it will pick up votes (compared to the 2010 general election) just because its opinion poll ratings are good. Nationally, Labour is benefiting from the opposition to the coalition - in particular the collapse of the Lib Dem vote after it joined the Tories in imposing austerity - but it is not winning support on the basis of any enthusiasm for a positive alternative. Labour's weaknesses also fuel a general anti-politics and anti-establishment mood that can find expression in votes for UKIP.

What is UKIP, and what does it represent?

 

The UKIP membership base is middle class, but its voter base is now clearly going well beyond the middle class. Previous polling indicates that UKIP is genuinely cross-class in its appeal. This should not distract from the fact that it is in essence a right-wing middle class party: in composition this can be seen in its leadership, activist base and membership, but it's also a matter of its politics, which are thoroughly at odds with working class interests.

It would be wrong to interpret UKIP as another far-right party comparable to the BNP (which, pleasingly, now has no councillors at all), although some fascists are sympathetic to UKIP and see it as the next best thing in the absence of a credible fascist party. But it is important to grasp that UKIP stands unequivocally to the right of the Tories and plays a dangerous role in relation to political debate about immigration and race.

 

Above all, UKIP's role is to pull the terms of political debate to the right. The party exerts pressure on a divided and fractious Tory Party, where the activist base and many backbench MPs are in fact close to UKIP politically. Strong electoral showings for UKIP also encourage a further shift to the right on immigration by Labour. This, in turn, makes it harder for left-wing arguments to get a hearing. It's also important to note that a partial revival of harder, more explicitly far-right politics is still a real possibility, as the crisis is prolonged and the 'debate' about immigration becomes nastier (especially if the Left doesn't shape things in a different direction).

The big issues motivating UKIP voters are immigration and Europe. Most people seemingly have little, if any, idea what its policies are beyond those issues. Politically UKIP is a small-government, low taxes, libertarian party that is bonded by hostility to the European Union and to immigration, with a dash of traditionalist social conservatism (e.g. opposition to gay marriage).

 

But it's specifically the question of immigration - which is tightly linked in their voters' minds with the EU - that is enabling the party's support to grow. Anti-immigrant sentiment is an important right-wing response to the capitalist crisis. That doesn't mean it is simply a product of the crisis - obviously such attitudes have much deeper and longer-term roots - but it is sharpened by the crisis, as people lash out at perceived threats and sources of economic and social problems.

 

We also need to register the role of Islamophobia. Overt Islamophobia is not UKIP's main selling point, but polling has clearly indicated strongly Islamophobic views among its voters and there's a tight connection between Islamophobia and contemporary anti-immigrant feeling. It's an important part of the ideological mix in a way that wasn't the case when Enoch Powell was stirring up trouble in the 1960s or when the National Front grew in the 1970s.

 

The notion of immigrants as both an 'enemy without' and an 'enemy within' is linked to contemporary imperialism and Islamophobia. This strand of racist ideology could yet become more prominent in the UKIP 'brand'.

 

UKIP and Tory decline

A key factor in the rise of UKIP is the long-term historic decline of the Conservative Party. In the 1950s and 1960s the Tories got close to 50% of the popular vote in general elections. In the Thatcher and Major era it was somewhat lower, but still reamined above 40%. In 1979 - the year of Thatcher's first victory - the Tories got almost 45%, then the Tories were in the 41-43% range in 1983, 1987 and 1992. In 2010, despite 13 years of a disillusioning Labour government and the economic crisis, Cameron's party could only muster 36% of the popular vote.

 

Party membership has declined massively (compared to 30 years ago never mind the peak of the 1950s) and the Tory base is no longer as cohesive as it was in the 1980s: it is somewhat smaller and more fractured. This does not, though, mean that we should disregard UKIP's growth on the grounds that it is simply a splitting of the right-wing vote. UKIP can pull British politics to the right and harden the right-wing base of the Tory Party.

 

The Tories' long-term decline overlaps with another long-term phenomenon: the decline in faith in the established political parties and the weakening of the political mainstream. In 1979 the Tories, Labour and Liberals got almost 97% of the votes between them; in 2010 it was 88%. And in many European, local and other elections so far this century it's been much lower.

 

The disillusionment with established politics expressed in that decline for the big established parties - and also in lower voter turnout - has resulted in greater fragmentation and volatility in elections. It is a Europe-wide phenomenon, not just British, and in very broad terms is the consequence of more than three decades of neo-liberalism and its hollowing out of democracy and trust in official politics. In the context of a weak Left (especially in the electoral sphere) to provide a more positive direction, UKIP can score significant electoral successes.

 

The Left's response

What should the Left's response be? Above all, we need to commit to creating a credible and broad counterweight to UKIP and the right-wing arguments (especially over immigration) which drive it, therefore offering a left-wing alternative to the crisis and pulling politics to the left. This cannot, in the short to medium term, take the form of an electoral party because prospects for the outside-Labour left in electoral politics are poor.

 

Instead our focus must be on extra-parliamentary struggle: marches, protests, strikes and campaigns. We need a united mass movement against cuts which rests upon a radically different, left-wing, perspective on the crisis. We need to popularise anti-austerity slogans and demands, alongside a left-wing interpretation of the state we are in. The People's Assembly - not just the event in Westminster Central Hall on 22 June itself, but using that gathering to build an on-going coalition that can deliver co-ordinated mass action - is our greatest opportunity here.

 

The Left also needs to directly challenge the right-wing myths about immigration and offer an alternative viewpoint, which is linked to making a positive case for multiculturalism, the role of migrant workers, and so on. This shouldn't be a purely defensive argument framed by our political enemies. A left-wing perspective on immigration has to be integral to socialists' arguments and activity in the broad anti-cuts movements of which we are a part.

 

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The 'Occupy' movement and the question of strategy

Occupy Oakland: mass protests, 2 November 2011

Two essays in the wide-ranging volume 'Socialist Register 2013: A Question of Strategy' engage with issues arising from the Occupy movement, which emerged from September 2011 onwards, first in New York and rapidly spreading nationwide (and to an extent beyond the US).

 

The overall theme of the volume is socialist strategy. These two particular contributions have much to offer current debates about strategies for countering neo-liberalism in an age of acute, on-going crisis, looking especially at the experiences of Occupy Wall Street and Occupy Oakland, placing them in context, and sketching conclusions that might be more generally applicable. This post reflects my engagement with the two essays.

 

Occupy: strengths and weaknesses

Occupy Wall Street signposted a resurgence of radical protest in the US and generated political debate, in particular about social and economic inequality. The Occupy movement can be seen as opening up new possibilities for the American left, though in a way that is as yet far from complete. After the initial Occupy moment - galvanising, exciting, hopeful - different directions were (and are) possible. There are naturally different ideas about what the movement is for, what it can become, and how it should organise.

Jodi Dean's 'Occupy Wall Street: after the anarchist moment' highlights the strengths of Occupy, but also notes that initially attractive qualities - inclusive, leaderless, participatory, consensus-seeking - brought serious problems too. The focus on 'consensus' masked political and tactical differences, so there was a tendency to fudge issues that actually needed thrashing out and resolving in order for action to be taken.

The need for democratic structures which can guide effective action was too often evaded. If there are not accountable leaders - or leadership bodies - then unaccountable leaders emerge. The rhetoric of being 'leaderless', however well-intentioned and genuine, is soon complemented by unaccountable leadership and weak democracy. This reduces the capacity for collective action around coherent demands.

In New York the biggest Occupy or Occupy-related protests resulted from trade union participation. However, without coherent strategy, through collective and democratic decision-making, there was a failure to build fully on the successes. Instead the tendency was for fragmentation into disparate campaigns and projects.

Without a clear, agreed strategy for reaching out to broader layers of support, sustaining the occupation was increasingly seen as an end in itself. The movement was liable to turn in on itself, 'obsessively reflecting on its failures adequately to include'. Questions of process became more important than questions of action.

'Occupy Wall Street', writes Dean, 'couldn't persist - its basic tenets undermined large-scale collective organisation but it was crucial, even necessary, to igniting a new anti-capitalist movement in the US'.

Occupy: a new vanguard?

Dean observes that Occupy 'mobilised not a proletariat bound to the factory but the proletarianised extended throughout uneven, unequal cities'. This is a valuable insight: in a period of low levels of industrial struggle, protests and occupations are the primary expression of resistance, but that doesn't mean abandoning any notion of working class struggle or politics. It is a question of forms of resistance, shaped by the realities of today's working class and the legacy of defeats for the organised working class during the long neo-liberal offensive.

Dean suggests - provocatively and, in my view, correctly - that the occupiers effectively formed a 'self-selected vanguard' in a broader struggle, taking on the kind of responsibilities Lenin attributed to professional revolutionaries or Bolshevik cadre. She writes that they were 'establishing and maintaining a continuity, a persistence, that enables broader numbers of people to join in the work of the movement. This continuity combats the fragmentation, localism and transitoriness of much of contemporary left politics.'

In the Leninist tradition the two crucial points about any vanguard are that they are organised in a coherent and collective body, and that they are in constant interaction with wider layers of the class. This is the basis for needing two interconnected things: revolutionary organisation and the united front. Occupy was, by its very nature, a politically disparate phenomenon. It wasn't as (relatively) politically and ideologically homogenous as a revolutionary organisation. It also struggled to establish forms of long-term organisation, limited instead by the transient character of a specific tactic: the occupation of public space.

Occupy activists' relationship with wider layers of support was complex. Some elements were outward-looking and determined to build wider (and long-term) alliances, especially with working class organisations. But there was also a strong pull - due to both material and political pressures - to be inward-looking and overly focused on simply maintaining the occupation itself (and on its own internal dynamics).

Occupy and direct action traditions

Barbara Epstein's 'Occupy Oakland: the question of violence' covers far more ground than the title suggests: its relevance is vastly wider than Oakland and the question of violence is only one of a number explored here. She focuses on a number of issues arising from Occupy Oakland, which was one of the biggest and most high-profile parts of the movement: 'the balance between non-violent tactics and militancy, between a focus on tactics and internal processes on the one hand, and on goals and strategy on the other, and the question of how to respond to police violence.'

Anarchist and anarchist-influenced ideas have become prominent in the last 30 years of protest movements. She suggests the first wave was in the 1980s with a particular focus on anti-nuclear activity, with feminist and environmentalist concerns at the fore. The second wave was the anti-capitalist movement after the great Seattle demonstration in late 1999, which benefited from a wider anti-system critique but borrowed many of the same preoccupations: inclusivity, horizontalism, consensus, etc. The third wave is Occupy.

Internationally the predominance of such ideas and forms of organisation is influenced by the weakness of tradition that were once stronger: trade unions, social democracy, official Communism and the organised left (of course these traditions have long been weaker in the US than in many European countries anyway). There is often a deep distrust of 'politics' and also of organisation: taken together, this feeds an emphasis on direct action, and a certain dynamism and militancy, but with little connection to mass politics or mass organisations it also encourages a degree of elitism and sectarianism.

Epstein explains that various occupations, including Occupy Oakland, modelled themselves on Occupy Wall Street: 'adopting, along with encampment, the General Assembly, some modified form of consensus process, the hand motions, the use of the human mic.' She points out that these tactics have strengths but also drawbacks: consensus, or even modified consensus, can allow a small minority to block the will of the majority; meetings can be long, tedious and unproductive; an appearance of consensus can disguise important differences.

 

Responding to police violence

 

In Occupy Oakland the issue of responding to police violence became a central one. Influential elements within the activist base of OO, heavily influenced by variants of anarchism, foregrounded physical confrontation with the forces of the state. This was coupled with a highly antagonistic attitude to anything deemed part of 'official politics'.

 

While there is something to be said for this uncompromising realism, there were two interconnected problems. The first problem is that it privileges the courage and commitment of relatively small numbers of activists over the capacity to mobilise large numbers. But if you want to isolate and defeat state forces, it makes sense to mobilise the largest numbers possible.

 

The other problem is that distrust of authority even extended to sympathetic elected politicians. At one demonstration, progressive local politicians were refused any opportunity to speak. This elitist approach made it harder to mobilise broader non-activist layers. As Epstein writes: 'a suspicious attitude towards progressive groups that engage in electoral politics deprives Occupy Oakland of potential allies'.

 

The response to a police attack on the Oakland camp on 25 October 2011 was to call a 'general strike', which in fact was a day of demonstrations supported by unions, as agreed at a General Assembly of over 1000 people. 20,000 people took part in the demonstrations on 2 November, with many taking the day off work. In the evening a much smaller number - many dressed in black and wearing masks - gathered. A confrontation with police ensued, with over 100 arrests.

 

Debate raged afterwards about this adoption of confrontational, small-scale 'militancy' by some of those involved in Occupy Oakland. The debate tended to be framed in terms of whether only 'non-violent' tactics should be used or if a 'diversity of tactics' (including confrontational tactics) was preferable. But, as Epstein observes, that confuses the issues.

 

The real debate needs to be about what tactics can successfully build on widespread popular enthusiasm for Occupy. Continued mass mobilisations, outreach and strengthening links with unions were all tactics for doing this; small-scale actions involving dedicated activists, by contrast, alienated broad support and risked diverting the movement down a blind alley. The truly radical aspect of 2 November 2011 was not any 'Black Bloc' heroics, but rather the mass movement in revulsion at state repression (and in solidarity with Occupy's stand against social inequality and injustice).

 

Beyond the initial 'Occupy moment'

 

Epstein considers what options were open to Occupy activists when the occupations ended in late 2011. She suggests that perhaps the most successful development for Occupy Wall Street was a campaign over housing, taking direct action in response to evictions. This indicated the potential that exists: addressing issues that are important to millions of working class people, allying with campaigns and community groups, extending the movement beyond a single, highly visible but transient tactic. Such action can enable community participation and build new coalitions.

 

Occupy Oakland had some similar experience with a protest march against school closures attracting around 5000 people. OO's most effective work was through its links with trade unions, but - as indicated above - this was in tension with other elements of the movement. It's also not clear if it has been sustained.

 

Epstein writes:

 

'The Occupy movement as a whole faces the problem of any movement whose identity is tied to a tactic and an internal process rather than to a clearly defined goal: what to do when the tactic reaches its limit and the process loses its glow, when internal differences, or fatigue and declining numbers, call for more stable forms of organising.'

 

This implies that a clearer sense of goals and demands is necessary. That is one part of what's meant when we refer to strategy. But it also points towards other aspects of strategy: who is involved in the movement, and what mechanisms are deployed for mobilising them and co-ordinating their efforts. It is, fundamentally, a question of how a small and committed activist minority can - in a sustained, long-term way - connect with much larger layers of people in joint activity towards meaningful shared demands.

 

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Trade unions and the American left

2011: Wisconsin trade unionists fight back

This blog post is prompted by reading 'Socialist Register 2013: A Question of Strategy', which I am in the course of reviewing for Counterfire.

 

In 'Rethinking Unions, Registering Socialism' - an interesting essay in Socialist Register 2013 - Sam Gindin's starting point is American trade unions' 'generally anaemic response to the Great Financial Crisis'. Gindin - a Canadian academic who has a long association with north America's union movements - observes that the US union movement failed to build in the activist and political space opened up by Occupy. The struggle in Wisconsin was exemplary, but its eventual defeat may be one reason why there hasn't been a general upswing in trade union action.

The key question Gindin addresses is this: 'does the rejuvenation of unions still really remain possible, or are unions now exhausted as an effective historical form through which working people organise themselves?'

The last comparable economic and social crisis - in the 1930s - prompted a response that, in the US, had industrial unionism at the fore. Is it bound to be different this time? In the 1930s the American left was very much shaped by participation in workers' struggles. Gindin considers the decline and weakened state of today's left, noting that there's a huge gap between the poor state of socialist organisation and the crying need for a socialist response to the crisis.

Gindin is conscious of the limits of trade union sectionalism, which pulls the unions away from co-ordination and from a generalised political response to the crisis. The unions are particularly weak after over three decades of neoliberal workforce restructuring, which has eroded workplace organisation. It is exceptionally difficult for union militants to build rank-and-file organisations when they are isolated in often small workplaces, operating in a context of low union density and low levels of strike action.

Gindin suggests a way forward suited to this context of low levels of confidence within the labour movement and a very small organised left co-existing with widespread working class anger and the radicalism signified by Occupy. His proposal is for workers' assemblies, which would have 'four elements - individual membership, community-based, class-focused and anti-capitalist in the ultimate goal'. These would be locally based and encompass a range of issues. They would be a way for left-wing activists to both group together and reach out to wider layers, with a radical dynamic (note the reference to being 'anti-capitalist').

 

This has attractive elements: it reflects a correct understanding that organisation is more likely to be area-based than workplace-based (in a period of low industrial struggle, and taking into account long-term workforce restructuring), it aims to make connections between different elements of the working class to overcome sectionalism, and has a general political perspective rather than being limited to single issues. 

 

However, it does seem a rather speculative model. It isn't, to the best of my knowledge, rooted in any existing processes. It isn't clear who would initiate such assemblies: is this a call to the unions to take such an initiative, or perhaps to small groupings of socialist activists, or a wider appeal to the broad progressive movement? Also, Gindin acknowledges the difficulties associated with such assemblies in the absence of real workers' struggles - they risk becoming talking shops, could turn inwards, etc - but doesn't really come up with a satisfactory solution.

 

Aside from a reference to Occupy in the opening paragraph, helping frame the issues, there isn't any consideration of the Occupy movement in the essay. This is rather surprising, and feels like a missed opportunity, as Occupy should surely be a crucial reference point for any meaningful discussion along these lines. It isn't clear if the omission is because the author is essentially dismissive of Occupy, or if it is a mere oversight,  or if it reflects a lack of concreteness to what is being discussed.

 

I also think there is a lack of clarity in Gindin's ideas about how such workers' assemblies actually relate to trade union renewal. The idea is that they could play a vital role in stimulating a renewal of workers' struggles, but how this might unfold is not explained.

 

What is missing here, it seems, is the concept of the united front, or a sense of how it might be applied in current circumstances. I am reluctant to offer prescriptions from my location in another continent - and of course there will already be at least localised or partial examples of this anyway - so I'll just indicate roughly what that might imply. It means that socialist activists initiate broader formations opposed to key aspects of the neo-liberal offensive. In Europe this overwhelmingly means austerity; in the US it isn't quite so straightforward, but there is (as Occupy testified) a sense that the vast majority are being made to pay for a crisis generated by a tiny, wealthy minority, with growth in inequality and a squeeze on working class living standards.

 

It is in the context of wider struggles, which can involve sometimes large numbers of people from non-activist or non-left backgrounds, that the American Left can find a way forward. These will often be broader-based and more ostensibly single-issue (though of course specific issues tend to be a lightning rod for wider grievances) than the workers' assemblies model implies. In this context it is possible for there to both a broad left renewal - a left equivalent of the Tea Party phenomenon, if you will - and also a strengthening of the radical left, with arguments about the need for fundamental system change that can resonate at least with a small minority of those involved in joint activity.

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We need to end the legacy of Thatcherism

This is cross-posted at Counterfire.  

Margaret Thatcher is dead. Her policies as prime minister ruined the lives of millions of people. Now her political heirs are trying to extend the damage she did in ways she only dreamed of.

The great political task before all of us is to ensure they fail. We need to make sure Thatcher’s legacy dies with her.

Those who will mourn the death of Margaret Thatcher include the bankers and get-rich-quick speculators in the City. She pioneered the neo-liberal casino capitalism which enriched them. So will Rupert Murdoch's newspapers, which have done so much to champion her rotten values. The big business parasites who got rich from the privatisation of public utilities will no doubt recall her with fondness.

Many of us won't mourn the death of Thatcher. The millions who lost their jobs as manufacturing was run down, whole industries ruined and unemployment rose, and the ex-miners, their families and their communities who fought Thatcher's government in the Great Strike of 1984-85, won’t mourn. The Liverpool families who fought for justice for the victims at Hillsborough for 23 years against an establishment cover-up will not mourn.

Many more – all those who reject a competitive ideology of dog-eats-dog, the race to the bottom in pay and conditions, and the vicious divide-and-rule that goes with it – will not mourn Thatcher’s passing.

Thatcher’s class war

The left are sometimes described by right-wing newspapers as trumpeting ‘class war’. The truth is that Thatcher was a class warrior for the rich and powerful, the leading class warrior of her generation. From the moment of her first government’s election in 1979, her mission was to shift the balance of wealth and power from the vast majority to a wealthy elite. She pushed through policies of privatisation and de-regulation, used the fear of unemployment to discipline those in work, and brought the market into public services.

Thatcher attacked a series of groups of workers and their trade unions – from the steelworkers in the early 1980s to ambulance drivers at the end of the decade, via the miners, printers and many more, in a concerted effort to destroy working class resistance to her right-wing agenda. She wanted to ‘free up’ public services and public utilities so the Tories’ rich friends could profit from them. She sought to remove any barriers to the accumulation of wealth in the hands of the few.

Thatcher was more than just a domestic political figure. Globally she – alongside US president Ronald Reagan – became an icon for the neoliberal model. She was famously friends with General Pinochet, who oversaw the killing of thousands of socialists so that corporations could plunder the country’s resources and exploit its working people. Thatcher was a cheerleader for IMF programmes imposed on developing countries, opening up their markets to powerful Western corporations and selling off public resources.

Thatcher was deeply committed to NATO and in particular the alliance with US imperialism. Her governments wasted billions on nuclear weapons and worked closely with the White House and Pentagon. She shamelessly used war in the Falklands to boost her waning poll ratings at home.

While systematically eroding the notion of a welfare state that cares for people from cradle to grave, Thatcher boosted the coercive power of the state. This was most obvious in the Miners’ Strike, during which she characterised the miners as ‘the enemy within’ and sanctioned massive police brutality against pit communities, and an approach to Northern Ireland which demonised resistance to the British imperialist state and bolstered discrimination against Catholics. She let Republican prisoners starve in northern Ireland’s jails. In the UK ‘mainland’, at a similar time, racist police attacked those who had the nerve to riot in conditions of poverty, hopelessness, racism and alienation.

The tide turns

Thatcher’s undoing was the poll tax. Shortly before Thatcher was ousted as prime minister, in 1990, socialist journalist Paul Foot wrote:

‘The anger has flared up over the hated poll tax, which attacks everyone except the rich and has succeeded in uniting opposition to the Thatcher government for the first time. From the north of Scotland to the Isle of Wight, the biggest movement of civil disobedience in Britain this century has persuaded hundreds of thousands of people to resist the tax by not paving it… But the new anger does not stop at the poll tax. It has become the symbol of all the other Tory plans and policies.’

The tide had turned. The Tories limped on for several years, with John Major as leader and with a tiny minority after the 1992 election, but the myth of Tory invincibility had been destroyed. In the 1990s there was a decisive shift in the opinion polls, leading to a Labour landslide in 1997. Large numbers of working class people never accepted Thatcherism; many more turned against it as the harsh realities of unemployment, repeated recessions, growing inequality, the chaos and waste that followed privatisation and the injustice of the poll tax were felt.

But, while the Labour landslide of 1997 reflected a popular rejection of Thatcher’s values, Blairism was a mark of Thatcher’s political legacy: she shifted mainstream politics to the right, pulling successive Labour leaderships along with her, relentlessly insisting ‘There is no alternative’. The acceptance of neoliberalism by the Westminster political class, reflected in New Labour’s policies during 13 years in office, is a reflection of success for the Thatcherites.

Despite all this, opinion polls have repeatedly shown large majorities opposed to privatisation, there is widespread hatred of Thatcher’s legacy and a powerful mood of opposition to establishment politics. It is not that working class people have become convinced of Thatcherism. Our weakness is in organisation. Trade unions have been hammered by defeats, Labour has shifted rightwards and the organised left is small.

Confronting the heirs of Thatcherism

We now face a Tory-led government that aims to build on Thatcher’s legacy and extend it. Cameron and Osborne want to weaken the welfare state more thoroughly than Thatcher’s administrations could ever hope to. This month’s punitive series of welfare ‘reforms’ – including the despised bedroom tax - are a raid on the poor while the millionaires get a tax cut. Thatcher left the NHS largely intact, but now it is being carved up.

The pay freeze and pensions cuts for millions of public sector workers are a sustained assault on living standards. Anti-union laws remain in place, the police are used to curtail protests and the right-wing press demonise those who need social security.

The Tories and their ideas are not popular. Our challenge is to mobilise the opposition that exists in every area and bring it together in a concerted mass movement that can end austerity and bring down the government. Many thousands have joined demonstrations in defence of the NHS and in recent weeks there have been scores of local protests against the bedroom tax. A number of trade unions are considering a renewal of much-needed strike action to confront the attacks on pay, pensions and public services.

The People’s Assembly Against Austerity – in Westminster Central Hall on 22 June – can connect and co-ordinate the struggles against cuts, planning mass action against this government of Thatcher’s children. Thatcher’s legacy lives on. So does the legacy of opposition, resistance and alternative ideas about the kind of society we need. Our task is to turn that into an organised social force capable of burying Thatcherism for good.

Register for the People’s Assembly: http://thepeoplesassembly.org.uk/


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